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Abstract
Economies of scale in upstream production can lead both disintegrated downstream
¯rm as well as its vertically integrated rival to outsource o®shore for intermediate
goods, even if o®shore production has moderate cost disadvantage compared to in-
house production of the vertically integrated ¯rm.
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JEL Classi¯cation: D41, L11, L13
1 Introduction
In this era of globalization, outsourcing has become a prominent industry practice. It has
been observed that scale economies could play an important role in determining ¯rms' sourc-
ing patterns.1 The aim of this paper is to explore the strategic e®ect of scale economies in
driving the outsourcing trend.
We carry out our analysis under a Cournot duopoly model in the downstream ¯nal good
market. One of these downstream ¯rms is vertically integrated, which can produce the
required intermediate good in-house, whereas the other ¯rm is disintegrated and cannot
produce it. A competitive fringe of ¯rms located o®shore can also produce the intermediate
good. The production technology of the intermediate good of both the integrated ¯rm and
the fringe exhibits economies of scale. The disintegrated ¯rm can acquire the intermediate
good either from its integrated rival or from the o®shore fringe, while the integrated ¯rm
can either produce it in-house or acquire it from the fringe.
Our main result is that, in this scenario, both downstream ¯rms|the disintegrated ¯rm
as well as its integrated rival| will outsource to the o®shore fringe even if the fringe has
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1It is noticed that \the importance of economies of scale is the most talked about aspect of outsourcing"
(Outsourcing Journal, May 2001. Source: http://www.outsourcing-journal.com/may2001-insights.html). A
major reason for ¯rms to outsource is to exploit \an outside provider's lower cost structure, which may be
the result of a greater economies of scale" (Burkholder (2005), p. 52). For example, in IT outsourcing, it is
reported that \in many cases the customer wants to outsource the IT-speci¯c know-how" because \vendor
specialized in IT o®ers attractive advantages including economies of scale" (Rost (2006), p. 19).
1a cost disadvantage in the intermediate good compared to the integrated ¯rm, so long as the
disadvantage is not too severe.2
This result is driven by the strategic e®ect of economies of scale. In the presence of
scale economies, an outsourcing order from the disintegrated ¯rm to its integrated rival
makes the rival more e±cient by lowering its marginal cost of production. Unwilling to give
such an e±ciency edge to its downstream rival, the disintegrated ¯rm turns to the o®shore
fringe for its intermediate good. Given that, scale economies of the fringe can be better
exploited if the integrated ¯rm outsources to the fringe as well. This leads both downstream
¯rms to outsource o®shore, with the integrated ¯rm giving up its in-house production of the
intermediate good. This strategic e®ect of scale economies dominates any cost disadvantage
the o®shore fringe might have, as long as such disadvantage is not substantial.
There is a large literature that considers various strategic aspects of sourcing (see, e.g.,
Cachon and Harker (2002), Shy and Stenbacka (2003), Chen et al. (2004), Heavner (2004),
Chen (2005), Buehler and Haucap (2006), Arya et al. (2008a,b), Chen et al. (2009)). The
paper most closely related to ours is Chen (2005), who argues that an integrated ¯rm might
have incentive to disintegrate in order to better exploit scale economies. In both papers, scale
economies creates reluctance on the part of disintegrated downstream ¯rm to purchase from
its integrated rival. However, our paper di®ers from Chen (2005) in several respects. First,
in Chen (2005) the integrated ¯rm is the only one in the upstream market whose technology
exhibits scale economies, while all other ¯rms in that market are part of a competitive fringe
and produce at constant marginal cost. In contrast, in our paper the technology of the
integrated ¯rm as well as the fringe has economies of scale. Scale economies of the fringe in
our model drive both downstream ¯rms|disintegrated as well as integrated|to order from
the fringe. This is an additional strategic e®ect of economies of scale which is absent in
the model of Chen (2005). Second, these two papers intend to explain di®erent economic
phenomena. Chen (2005) focuses on vertical disintegration as a device for integrated ¯rm to
win upstream competition, whereas in our paper, the objective is to highlight the strategic
role of scale economies in driving the o®shore outsourcing trend. In particular, we show that
as long as o®shore providers specialize on upstream production, the integrated ¯rm will give
up its in-house production and join its disintegrated rival in outsourcing o®shore.3
Cachon and Harker (2002) illustrate a di®erent strategic e®ect scale economies might have
to favor outsourcing. When ¯nal good competitors face scale economies in their intermediate
good production, in-house production of the intermediate good leads them strong incentive
2According to our result, the presence of economies of scale may lead the trend of o®shore outsourcing
to well persist even when o®shore cost advantage diminishes. In fact, nowadays evidences are showing that
di®erence in labor costs between countries becomes smaller as time goes by. To quote one observation, \in
most o®shore countries, the salaries for software developers have been continually growing over the past few
years. Further future growth is to be expected" (Rost (2006), p. 35).
3There are evidences which support the argument that, ¯rms by not entering the ¯nal-good market, are
more likely to attract orders for intermediate goods. For example, in 1980's, US companies in the electronics
industry were seeking \to diversify their sources of supply". In order to get the US business, Malaysia
and Singapore emphasized in their government policies that both nations \were not attempting to promote
national champions in the electronic industry", but rather \to build a complementary supply base, not to
create local rivals that might displace foreign producers". Their success in becoming major supply hubs for
electronic components is well documented (see Ravenhill (2003)). Although both nations have the advantage
of low labor cost, their deliberate abstention from ¯nal-good markets also created them a competitive edge
in markets of intermediate goods.
2for cutting prices in the ¯nal good market in order to boost selling thus better exploit scale
economies. Instead, if they outsource the intermediate good to upstream provider by paying
unit price, such incentive for further cutting downstream prices is weakened, which mitigates
downstream competition therefore may lead to both ¯rms' advantage.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and gives our major
result. Section 3 fully characterizes equilibrium of the model, also gives the proof. Section 4
then discusses and concludes.
2 Model and Major Result
Firms I and D are Cournot duopolists in the market for a ¯nal good ¯. Let qk be the
quantity of ¯ produced by ¯rm k; k = I;D and Q = qI + qD. The inverse demand of good
¯ is P = maxfa ¡ Q;0g, where a > 0:
An intermediate good ® is required to produce ¯: Firm I can manufacture ®, but D
cannot. In other words, ¯rm I is a vertically integrated ¯rm while D is disintegrated. There
is also an \outside" competitive fringe of identical ¯rms which can manufacture ®. Let U
be a representative ¯rm of this fringe.
I and D can convert one unit of ® into one unit of ¯ at the same constant average
cost, which is normalized to be zero. Both I and U face economies of scale in producing ®.
Speci¯cally, for j = I;U, the cost function Cj(q) of ¯rm j is given by
CI(q) =
½
bq ¡ cq2 for q · b=2c
b2=4c for q > b=2c ; CU(q) =
½
¸bq ¡ cq2 for q · ¸b=2c
(¸b)2=4c for q > ¸b=2c
We make the following assumptions:
b=2c > a > ¸b > 0: (1)
The ¯rst inequality guarantees that, in equilibrium the production of good ® entails positive
marginal cost. Also assume
1 · ¸ < ¹ ¸ ´ (a + b ¡ 2ac)=2b(1 ¡ c): (2)
Here ¸ ¸ 1 catches that U may have a cost disadvantage compared to I;4 ¸ < ¹ ¸ guarantees
that D will produce positive quantity when it orders good ® exclusively from U, given that
I produces ® by itself.5 Note that for j = I;U, average cost ACj(q) = Cj(q)=q is linearly
decreasing in q for q · b=2c. Moreover, (1) and (2) imply
1=2 > b=2a > c > 0; (3)
so that Cj(q);j = I;U is not \too concave" in order to ensure the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium in the market ¯.
4This assumption allows us to focus on the strategic e®ect of scale economies in ¯rms' sourcing decision.
Our model is readily extended to the case when o®shore suppliers have cost advantage.
5If this assumption is violated, then the cost of ® for U is too large and D has to rely entirely on I for
its required ®: Then it is optimal for I to charge a very high price of ® for D: This will drive D out of the
market ¯ and establish I a monopolist. It can be shown from (2) that b=2c > ¹ ¸b; so ¹ ¸ satis¯es (1).
3For k = I;D, ¯rm k has two alternative sources of acquiring ®: either exclusively from
U or exclusively from I.6 Denote the sourcing mode of ¯rm k by ±k. Then ±k = j if ¯rm k
orders ® from j = U;I; with ±I = I meaning that I produces ® by itself. In our model U is
a non-strategic player due to the perfect competition.7 The strategic interaction between I
and D is modelled into a three-stage game, denoted as game G:
Stage one. I announces price pI for good ®.
Stage two. I and D simultaneously choose their sourcing modes ±I;±D.
Stage three. I and D engage in quantity competition in the market ¯.
Solution concept for the game is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in pure
strategy.
Let X be the total quantity of ® outsourced to U. For X > 0, average production cost
of U is
v ´ v(X) ´ AC(X) = ¸b ¡ cX:
Since U is a non-strategic player, the price of U for good ® when U receives total outsourcing
order X is given by v(X). There exist four outsourcing regimes, denoted by ± ´ ±I±D 2
fII;IU;UU;UIg. If ± = II, then X = 0; if ± = IU, then X = qD; if ± = UU, then
X = qI + qD = Q. Finally, if ± = IU (i.e., D outsources to I but I outsources to U),
then I outsources qI to U to meet its own demand; in addition, it also orders qD from U to
ful¯ll the demand of D. Therefore, total quantity ordered from U is X = qI + qD = Q. Let
q = (qI;qD). Payo®s for each ¯rm at the terminal nodes are ¼±




















D (pI;v;q)) = (P(Q)qI ¡ v(Q)Q + pIqD;P(Q)qD ¡ pIqD)
Our main result to game G asserts that if the cost disadvantage of U is not too signi¯cant
(i.e. ¸ is not too large), then both I and D outsourcing to U is the unique SPNE outsourcing
regime. The main result is also summarized in Figure 1 below, in which ¸ is varied on the
horizontal axis.
The Main Result There is a threshold µ 2 (1; ¹ ¸] such that if ¸ 2 [1;µ); then in any SPNE,
both I and D orders ® exclusively from U:
Figure 1: SPNE Outsourcing Regime
6The exclusivity can be justi¯ed on the ground that intermediate goods produced by di®erent providers
might be specialized, making it infeasible for the ¯nal-good producer to use multiple sources of intermediate
goods in the same production process. Moreover, there can be negotiation cost in the transaction for the
intermediate good.
7This assumption is meant to simplify the analysis. Our essential ¯nding will not be a®ected if U is an
upstream monopolist and thus can strategically determine its price for good ®.
4Observe that when ¸ 2 (1;µ); U has a cost disadvantage compared to I, yet both I and
D outsource ® to U rather than to I. Strategic considerations dominate ¯rms' behavior here.
This con¯rms our claim that outsourcing to o®shore locations can persist due to strategic
e®ect of scale economies, even if o®shore costs rise moderately as long as o®shore producers
abstain from the ¯nal good markets.
3 Model Analysis
In this section, we shall ¯rst characterize the SPNE of game G. Its proof is derived after we
illustrate the procedure of backward induction to solve the game.
3.1 SPNE of Game G: The Detailed Characterization
Before we fully characterize SPNE of game G, it is useful to de¯ne µ:
µ ´ min(¹ ¸; ~ ¸);





2b(52c2 ¡ 105c + 54)
; ^ ¸ ´
a(3 ¡ 4c) + Z
p
1 ¡ c




with A = a(80c2 ¡ 144c + 63) + b(24c2 ¡ 66c + 45);B = (3 ¡ 2c)(3 ¡ 4c)(a ¡ b);Z =
2b(3 ¡ 2c) ¡ a(3 ¡ 4c): We have 1 < ~ ¸ < ^ ¸. If c is not very close to 1=2, then ^ ¸ < ¹ ¸.
Price of U can take two values in SPNE, ¹ v and v, de¯ned as
¹ v ´
b¸(3 ¡ 4c) ¡ c(a + b ¡ 2ac)









(a + b ¡ 2ac)c
(3 ¡ 4c)(1 ¡ c)
:
De¯ne I's monopoly price as pM ´ a+b¡2ac
2(1¡c) < a. We have pM > ¹ v > v > 0, and ¹ pI(v) < v
for v < pM.
Theorem 1 SPNE of game G is characterized below.
(I) For ¸ 2 [1;µ), ± = UU is the unique SPNE outsourcing regime. In any SPNE,
v = v;pI ¸ v.
(II) For ¸ 2 (µ; ¹ ¸), ± = II is the unique SPNE outsourcing regime. Moreover, (v;pI) =
(¹ v; ¹ pI(¹ v)) if ¸ > ^ ¸, (v;pI) = (v; ¹ pI(v)) if ¸ < ^ ¸, and (v;pI) is either (¹ v; ¹ pI(¹ v)) or
(v; ¹ pI(v)) at ¸ = ^ ¸.
(III) If ~ ¸ < ¹ ¸ (i.e. µ = ~ ¸), two outsourcing regimes can arise in SPNE at ¸ = µ: either
± = UU with v = v;pI ¸ v; or ± = II with (v;pI) = (v; ¹ pI(v)).
5Proof: Proof is in the following subsection.
When the o®shore fringe has cost disadvantage, the existence of SPNE where ± = UU
hinges on the existence of economies of scale. As shown by the following corollary, when the
size of scale economies shrinks, so does the range of ¸ where both I and D outsource to U.
The intuition is as follows. Since U is less e±cient, the smaller the economies of scale, the
more inclined D is to outsource to I: ¯rst, D becomes less concerned about the competitive
edge I can acquire through supplying D; second, there can be a larger e±ciency gain. As a
result, in SPNE the range of ¸ is larger where D orders from I and I produces in-house.
Corollary 1 µ ! 1 when c ! 0.
Proof: It follows by noticing that limc!0 ¹ ¸ = a+b
2b > 1 and limc!0 ~ ¸ = 1.
3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In order to derive proof of Theorem 1, we ¯rst do backward induction to solve game G. We
start from the quantity decisions in stage three for given outsourcing regimes.
The values of (pI;v) relevant are such that in equilibrium both I and D produce positive
quantities for ¯, given by pI < pM;v < pM. There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium
(q±
I(pI;v);q±
D(pI;v)) in each outsourcing regime ± (details are given in Appendix). The cor-
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2a¡b¡pI . The following lemma follows direct calculation and is intuitive:
when I produces in-house and D outsources to I, I prefers to charge pI for D as high as




dpI > 0 for pI 2 (0;pM).
We move back to stage two. At given value v, when I produces in-house, there exists a
threshold value of pI given by ¹ pI(v). If and only if pI < ¹ pI(v), D strictly prefers ordering
from I to ordering from U. Notice that ¹ pI(v) < v, implying that if I produces in-house, D
will order from I if and only if pI is su±ciently lower than v. The following lemma follows
direct calculation.
Lemma 2 ¼II
D (pI) T ¼IU
D (v) for pI S ¹ pI(v).
We move back to stage one, where I and U compete in prices for supplying ®. Let us ¯rst
rule out a trivial equilibrium. When pI = v, given that I outsources to U, D is indi®erent
between ordering from I or from U, and it can occur that D orders from I. It thus can
arise in equilibrium that pI = v, followed by ± = UI. However, this equilibrium in essence
6is ± = UU. To avoid this trivial equilibrium, we treat any SPNE with pI = v followed by
± = UI as ± = UU.8
We have several major ¯ndings to the price competition in stage one. First, it can be
shown that, whenever pI 6= v, ± = UI can not be in any SPNE. Hence in equilibrium, U
supplies positive quantity only in outsourcing regime UU or IU. If outsourcing regime is
IU, U's price v is solved from v = AC(qIU
D (v)) as ¹ v; if outsourcing regime is UU, v is solved
from v = AC(qUU
I (v)+qUU
D (v)) as v. Second, given that pI = ¹ pI(v), at either v = ¹ v or v = v,
I is better o® also supplying D whenever I produces in-house to meet its own demand of ®.
In other words, I always prefers regime II to IU. Third, given that v = v and D outsources
to U, I strictly prefers regime UU to IU only if the cost disadvantage of U is not too big,
i.e., ¸ < ^ ¸. Finally, comparing regimes II and UU for I under (pI;v) = (¹ pI(v);v), we ¯nd
that I strictly prefers regime UU to II only if ¸ < ~ ¸. The following lemma summarizes the
major ¯ndings to stage one.
Lemma 3 (a) In any SPNE, it can not be pI 6= v and ± = UI.
(b) ¼II
I (¹ pI(¹ v)) > ¼IU
I (¹ v); ¼II
I (¹ pI(v)) ¸ ¼IU
I (v) with equality holds only at ¸ = 1.
(c) If ^ ¸ < ¹ ¸, then ¼UU
I (v) T ¼IU
I (v) for ¸ S ^ ¸. Otherwise ¼UU
I (v) > ¼IU
I (v).
(d) If ^ ¸ < ¹ ¸, then v = v for ¸ < ^ ¸, v = ¹ v for ¸ > ^ ¸, either v = v or v = ¹ v at ¸ = ^ ¸.
Otherwise v = v.
(e) If ~ ¸ < ¹ ¸, then ¼UU
I (v) T ¼II
I (¹ pI(v)) for ¸ S ~ ¸. Otherwise ¼UU
I (v) > ¼II
I (¹ pI(v)).
Proof: (a) Suppose not. Given ±I = U, if D deviates from ±D = I to ±D = U, its pro¯t
changes from ¼UI
D (pI;v) to ¼UU
D (v). For D to have no incentive to deviate, it must be pI < v
by (4). However, again by (4), I will deviate to pI = v followed by ±I = U, since its pro¯t is
larger in this case no matter ±D = I or ±D = U. A contradiction.
(b), (c), (e) follows direct calculation. (d) follows (c) and the perfect competition in
upstream fringe.
We are now ready to give proof of Theorem 1. Since proof of parts (I), (II) and (III) are
similar, we only gives proof of (I) in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1 (I) Step one. We show that given v = v;pI ¸ v, ± = UU is in SPNE.
Given ±I = U, if D deviates from ±D = U to ±D = I, its pro¯t changes from ¼UU
D (v) to
¼UI
D (pI). By (4), D is no better o® for pI = v and is worse o® for pI > v. Thus D will not
deviate. On the other side, given ±D = U, if I deviates from ±I = U to ±I = I, its pro¯t
changes from ¼UU
I (v) to ¼IU
D (pI). By Lemma 3(c), it is worse o® since ¸ < min(¹ ¸; ~ ¸) < ^ ¸. I
will not deviate either. Thus ± = UU is in SPNE.
Step two. We show that v = v;pI ¸ v is in SPNE. By Lemma 3(d), v = v. We need
to check if I has incentive to deviate to pI < v. Suppose it deviates. Then in stage two,
± = UU can not arise since by (4), D will deviate from ±D = U to ±D = I. Moreover, ± = IU
can not arise since by Lemma 3(c), I is pro¯table deviating from ±I = I to ±I = U. Suppose
± = UI in stage two. By (4), I is strictly worse o® under UI than under UU. Hence I will
not deviate to pI < v for ± = UI. Suppose ± = II in stage two. By Lemma 2, it can be
8Assuming the existence of some transaction cost for I to supply D can break the tie and make any SPNE
with pI = v followed by ± = UI disappear.
7the case only if pI · ¹ pI(v), otherwise D will deviate from ±D = I to ±D = U. However, by
Lemma 3(e) and Lemma 1, I is strictly worse o®. Thus I will not deviate to pI < v for
± = II either. We conclude that under no circumstance will I deviates to pI < v.
Step three. We show that there does not exist other SPNE. First, v = v by Lemma 3(d).
Second, by Lemma 3(a), ± = UI is o®-equilibrium. Third, for ¸ < ^ ¸, by Lemma 3(c),
± = IU is o®-equilibrium. Fourth, suppose in some SPNE ± = II. By Lemma 2, it must
be pI · ¹ pI(v) < v. However, I is pro¯table deviating to p0
I > v. By doing so, by step one,
Lemma 2, Lemma 3(a) and (c), it must be ± = UU in stage two. Then by Lemma 3(e), I
is strictly better o®. A contradiction. II can not be in SPNE. Last, suppose in some SPNE
± = UU with pI < v. However, by (4), D will deviate to ±D = I, again a contradiction. We
conclude that there does not exist SPNE other than v = v;pI ¸ v, followed by ± = UU.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
We show that the strategic e®ect of scale economies can drive both integrated and disinte-
grated downstream ¯rms to outsource o®shore for intermediate goods, even if there is modest
cost disadvantage with o®shore providers in producing the intermediate goods. The reason
is, under economies of scale in upstream production, disintegrated downstream ¯rm tends to
purchase intermediate goods from o®shore pure provider rather than its vertically integrated
rival. Then driven by the incentive to exploit scale economies, vertically integrated ¯rm will
give up in-house production and also outsource o®shore.
In our setting, the existence of o®shore competitive fringe sustains a duopoly market
for the ¯nal good ¯ and consumers are almost always better o®. Without the fringe, the
integrated ¯rm I will charge a high price for good ® to drive ¯rm D out of the market, then
produce in-house good ® as a monopolist. If so, its monopoly quantity of good ¯ is given by
a ¡ pM = (a ¡ b)=2(1 ¡ c). As long as ¸ < ¹ ¸, the emergence of o®shore fringe ensures that
both I and D are active in the market ¯. If the cost disadvantage of U is relatively big (i.e.
¸ 2 (µ; ¹ ¸)) so that in equilibrium ± = II (both I and D orders good ® from I), it is veri¯able
that the duopoly quantity is always larger than the monopoly quantity, hence consumers are
better o®. In this case, production is also e±cient since the low-cost ¯rm I supplies good
®. If the cost disadvantage of U is modest (i.e. ¸ 2 [1;µ)) such that in equilibrium ± = UU
(both I and D orders good ® from U), the duopoly quantity is almost always larger than
the monopoly quantity. We ¯nd that, exception occurs only in extreme cases where c is very
close to 1=2 and ¸ is very close to the corresponding µ.9
Although we exogenously assume the exclusivity in downstream ¯rms' sourcing mode
throughout our analysis, exclusivity can arise endogenously due to scale economies in up-
stream production technology. Moreover, our model can be extended to including two or
9For example, suppose a = 10;b = 9:5. By (3), the upper bound of c is 0:475. For c < 0:4473,
the duopoly quantity under ± = UU is always larger than the monopoly quantity. Let c = 0:47, then
µ = minf¹ ¸; ~ ¸g = 1:0025. Then for ¸ < 1:0015, the duopoly quantity under ± = UU is larger than the
monopoly quantity. The reverse is true for ¸ > 1:0015. The intuition is as follows. When ± = UU with c
very close to 1
2 and ¸ very close to its upper bound µ, two e®ects result in a smaller duopoly quantity than
the monopoly quantity. On the one side, since U has a relatively large cost disadvantage, it charges a high
price of good ® for the downstream duopolists, leading to a relatively small duopoly quantity. On the other
side, since I faces large scale economies when it produces in-house as a monopolist, it produces a relatively
large monopoly quantity in order to better exploit economies of scale.
8more downstream disintegrated ¯rms, which will strengthen the strategic e®ect of scale
economies in driving downstream competitors to outsource o®shore. In the type-symmetric
pure strategy equilibrium, all these disintegrated ¯rms order from the o®shore pure supplier,
which further drives down the supplier's average cost hence also its price of ®, making the
integrated ¯rm to be more willingly outsource o®shore.
Our results are derived under downstream quantity competition with homogeneous prod-
ucts. One concern is to what extent our results carry over price competition. Suppose ¯rms
I and D produce heterogeneous good ¯ and decide their prices in stage three. Literature
shows that, in context of price competition and linear production cost, strategic consider-
ation can lead ¯rm D to favor ¯rm I for the supply of good ®. The reason is, when I is
making pro¯t in the market ® by supplying D, I has less incentive to lower its price for
good ¯ because aggressive pricing will reduce D's sale hence hurt I's pro¯t in the market ®.
(see Chen (2001); Chen et al. (2004); Arya et al. (2008b)). Here with economies of scale in
the production of ®, D's outsourcing to I imposes two opposite e®ects on the competition
in the market ¯. On the one side, it gives I a competitive edge on account of economies
of scale, making I more aggressive. On the other side, it creates the strategic incentive
for I to soften downstream price competition, as identi¯ed in Chen (2001), making I less
aggressive. Nevertheless, we ¯nd that, as long as the cost disadvantage of the o®shore fringe
is not too big, the ¯rst e®ect can dominate. With price competition, it again occurs that,
in equilibrium both I and D outsource to the o®shore fringe for good ® even if the o®shore
provider has a modest cost disadvantage.
Appendix
When both ¯rms I and D are active in the market ¯, their Cournot quantities in stage
three for each outsourcing regime are given below. After that, two observations are listed
out, which shows that in SPNE, upstream prices (pI;v) indeed lead to positive quantities
produced by I and D. Note that pM > 2b¡a¡2ac
1¡2c and pM > 2b ¡ a.
a. ± = II. If pI 2 (2b¡a¡2ac









a + b ¡ 2ac ¡ 2(1 ¡ c)pI
3 ¡ 2c
:









a + b ¡ 2ac ¡ 2(1 ¡ c)v
3 ¡ 4c
:
c. ± = UU. For v < a, Cournot quantity is positive for each ¯rm, given by
q
UU
















a + v ¡ 2pI
3
:
Observation 1 ¹ v > 2b ¡ a; pM > ¹ v > v > 0.
Observation 2 ¹ pI(¹ v); ¹ pI(v) 2 (2b¡a¡2ac
1¡2c ;pM).
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